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Abstract.  Modifying characters of a piece of text to their visual similar ones 
often appear in spam in order to fool inspection systems and other conditions, 
which we regard as a kind of adversarial attack to neural models. We propose a 
way of generating such visual text attack and show that the attacked text are read-
able by humans but mislead a neural classifier greatly. We apply a vision-based 
model and adversarial training to defense the attack without losing the ability to 
understand normal text. Our results also show that visual attack is extremely so-
phisticated and diverse, more work needs to be done to solve this. 
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1 Introduction 
When reading a piece of text, humans need to judge the meaning of the characters from 
their appearance before understanding the text. In the face of characters that have not 
been seen before (visual text attack), we can infer the meaning of the characters if we 
have seen visual similar characters: ‘ạƿpӏϵ’ means ‘apple’. Most of current NLP models 
initialize random embeddings for characters or words based on their identities and up-
date the embeddings during training, visual text attack may cause them to fail to under-
stand text. Recently, some work encodes characters with visual information, (Dai and 
Cai, 2017) tries to apply the image features of Chinese characters to language modeling 
and word segmentation tasks. In the real world, there is much malicious behavior trying 
to utilize visual vulnerabilities of models, such as spam (Hosseini et al., 2017), dirty 
talk in games and forums, etc. 
The research on adversarial attack has been paid much attention recently, which aims 
to reveal the weakness of neural models and improve robustness of the models against 
various attacks such as replacement and deletion of words. Compared with the general 
attack on NLP systems: 1) Visual attack is to replace a character X in the original text 
with another character X’ that looks like X and no knowledge of language is required. 
2) Humans are more robust against visual attacks than grammatical attacks (Hosseini 
et al., 2017). For a character X, (Eger et al., 2019) utilizes the python PIL package and 
a font file to draw X on a (length: 24, width: 24) image(Fig. 1. Left), stacks the rows of 
the image into a one-dimensional (24*24=576) vector as an image-based character 
embedding (ICE) of X, then calculates cosine distance with other characters based on 
ICEs to find the nearest neighbors as disturbances. Problem with this method is ICE 
neighbors are based on pixel matching of images but their two-dimensional information  
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Char ICES I2CES DCES 
H ᕼ Н Η Ḥ Ḫ ῌ Ḣ Ḩ П Π ᕼ Н Η н ʜ Ḥ Ḣ Һ ᵸ ᴴ H Ⱶ ℌ Ȟ Ⱨ Ħ Ḧ ᴴ Ḩ Ĥ 
q ԛ ɋ ց g ɡ ģ ġ ɑ ḡ ɖ ԛ ϥ զ ɋ ƣ ᾳ ợ գ ց g q ʠ ɋ 
3 З Ǝ ⴺ 8 Ҙ ߃ Ⅎ 9 Ƨ S З ȝ Ȝ ӡ ʒ ɜ ҙ з Յ ₃  
4 ⇞↿↨↑⬍ ↕ ⬆⇂⇃ⵐ Գ ⁴ ₄ ✰ ᖧ Գ ₠ ц ɋ զ  
Table 1. up to 10 nearest neighbors in different character embedding spaces 
                             
Fig. 1. letter ‘b’ drawn by PIL package: Left: (24,24) image; Right: (100, 100) image with cen-
tering, rotation and noise. 
is not fully used, which may cause that some visually similar neighbors with different 
sizes and positions cannot be found. As shown in Table 1(For illustration, characters 
and their neighbors shown in this paper are in a font named Dejavu Sans used in our 
experiments), many ICE neighbors of character q are not like q and even difficult for 
humans to recognize. (Zhao et al., 2017) inverts a picture P with CNN into a one-di-
mensional hidden embedding z, disturbing z and then utilizing W-GAN to convert z to 
an image P’ as a disturbed sample. For printed characters there are two problems: 1) 
There is only one image for every character in a font file, CNN is easy to overfit; 2) P’ 
can’t be directly taken as neighbors because P’ is very likely not include in a font(mod-
els yield decimals while pixels from fonts contain only integers). If P’ is used to find 
neighbors, it becomes pixel matching like ICE which is not reasonable. On defense: 
(Eger et al., 2019) takes ICEs as embeddings of characters and neural models do suffer 
less from visual text attack. 
Our work on attack: We utilize CNN to get visual information of characters, augment 
data of characters and get more visually similar characters; on defense: we apply a 
vision-based neural model and adversarial training and show that they are useful for 
resisting visual attack. 
2 Method 
To better deal with visual text adversarial attack, we apply 1) a vision-based perturber, 
2) a vision-based neural model.  
2.1 Vision-based Text perturbations  
We hope that after visual text perturber(VP) disturbs certain characters in a input text, 
humans can still understand the text correctly, while neural models may fail. The pa-
rameters of VP are a character X, a probability p and a character embedding space 
(CES). Each character has up to 20 nearest neighbors in the CES for preparation. For  
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Conv2d (16, 5, 5, 0), MaxPool2d(2, 2), ReLu 
Conv2d (32, 3, 3, 1), MaxPool2d(2, 2), ReLu 
Conv2d (64, 3, 3, 1), MaxPool2d(2, 2), ReLu 
Conv2d (128, 3, 3, 1), MaxPool2d(2, 2), ReLu 
Conv2d (128, 3, 3, 1), MaxPool2d(2, 2) 
Linear(1152, 500), Linear(500, num_class) 
Table 2. architecture of the model used for VP training. Parameters of Conv2d: number of out-
put channels, kernel size, padding 
each character in text there is p probability that it will be replaced. If a character X is 
disturbed, one element in neighbors of X is randomly selected. We represent VP as: 
VP = VP (X, p, CES) 
For CES, (Eger et al., 2019) proposes image-based character embedding space (ICES) 
and description-based character embedding space (DCES). ICES is based on ICE 
introduced in §1. DCES first gets description of a character from the Unicode 11.0.0 
final names list, for example, the description of ‘b’ is 'LATIN SMALL LETTER B', 
characters whose descriptions contain the same character and the same case are consid-
ered as neighbors of ‘b’, such as ‘ḅ’, description of which is 'LATIN SMALL LETTER 
B WITH STROKE', these two descriptions both include ‘SMALL’ and ‘B’. 
We propose image-based 2-dimensional character embedding space(I2CES) which 
utilizes more features of images. The images of characters drawn with PIL are input to 
a CNN classifier. The architecture of the classifier is shown in Table 2, which is a 
slightly modified version of VGG-16(Simoyan and Zisserman, 2014). In order to 
capture more visual information, we expand input image size(24, 24) to (100, 100). The 
characters are centered(shown in Fig. 1. Right) to make the model focus on the shape 
and to deal with characters that look very similar but in different positions. To prevent 
the classifier from overfitting we augment training data through: eight different 
fonts(differ by thickness and whether oblique); two font sizes {60, 80} to make the 
model robust to different sizes; rotating the characters from -20 to 20 degrees by the 
center of images, the interval is 2; adding salt-and-pepper noise. The final number of 
each character’s samples is 8*2*20=320. We suppose that when the model converges 
and the accuracy is more than 90%, the model has mastered visual features of the 
characters like human beings to a certain extent. For a character X, we take a specific 
sample of X as input to the trained classifier: font size 80, no rotation, a font (named 
Dejavu Sans) chosen from the 8 fonts mentioned before. Rather than applying output 
of the final linear layer, we take output of the last convolutional module and flatten the 
output as I2CES, reason of this decision is discussed in §4. Cosine similarity is used to 
calculate distance between embeddings. 
2.2 Vision-based neural model 
Many models encode text in character level and have achieved very good results, we 
use Char-CNN (Zhang et al, 2015) as the base model. Char-CNN encodes characters 
with one-hot vectors and processes them with 1-Dimension Convnets. In (Eger et al., 
2019), ICEs are directly fed into the neural model as embeddings of characters. Like  
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Fig. 2. Vision-based neural model: 2D-CNN module takes a character’s image and outputs an 
embedding, Char-CNN module processes the embeddings of characters in text 
 
Char I2CES h_set 
q ԛ ϥ զ ɋ ƣ ᾳ ợ գ ց g ԛ ϥ զ ɋ ƣ ợ գ 
4 Գ ⁴ ₄ ✰ ᖧ Գ ₠ ц ɋ զ	 Գ ⁴ ₄ ᖧ Գ ц 
 
Char ICES h_set 
q ԛ ɋ ց g ɡ ģ ġ ɑ ḡ ɖ ԛ ɋ 
4 ⇞↿↨↑⬍ ↕ ⬆⇂⇃ⵐ  
Table 3. neighbors in ICES and I2CES and corresponding effective ones 
(Shimada et al. 2016) and (Dai and Cai 2017), we put a naive CNN (3 convolution 
layers and 2 MaxPool layers) module into Char-CNN which aims to utilize the visual 
information of characters. As illustrated in Fig. 2, for each character X in input text, 
the image of X is fed into a 2D CNN, the flattened features of the last convolution 
layer are taken as embeddings of the characters. The 2D CNN is trained together with 
Char-CNN. 
3 Experiment 
We perturb characters with I2CES and see how vanilla Char-CNN responses to the 
visual attack. Then we evaluate the effect of several defense methods. The experiment 
environment is pytorch 1.4.0 and machine is GTX1080ti 11GB GPU. 
3.1 Datasets 
We choose three classic classification datasets:  
AG’s news corpus: 4 classes, 120000 train and 7600 test samples, 
DBPedia ontology dataset: 14 classes, 560000 train and 70000 test samples, 
Yelp reviews: 5 classes, 650000 train and 50000 test samples. 
3.2 Perturb 
For I2CES, dimension of the output got from the convolutional layer(Conv2d (128, 3, 
3, 1), MaxPool2d(2, 2) in Tabel 2) is (128,3,3), dimension of final embeddings of char-
acters is (1, 1152). 4378 characters can be found to have visual neighbors, so class num- 
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Fig. 3. Accuracy degradation of origin classifier under I2CES attack 
 
Fig. 4. Half of intersection of neighbors are chosen for DCES, the left half are for I2CES 
ber of the CNN in §2.1 is 4378. All these characters need to be included in the 8 fonts 
mentioned in §2.1 and images of which cannot be blank (Some Unicode numbers are 
in these fonts while their pictures drawn by PIL have no black pixels). In Table 1 we 
list neighbors of some characters in ICES, DCES and I2CES. We pick effective 
(visually similar judged by 3 volunteers) ones from ICES, I2CES (Table 3 shows some 
examples) and take them as new replacement set, h_set. Number of h_set(letters a-z & 
A-Z) in ICES and I2CES are 572 and 697, showing that I2CES successfully capture 
more visual information than ICES. Compared to ICES, neighbors found by I2CES are 
more diverse: some of the neighbors are different in character’s positions and sizes in 
images. Compared to DCES, I2CES is more general: DCES is limited to commonly 
used English letters, numbers and many other symbols can’t be perturbed by DCES, 
while I2CES is based on visual information, most characters (such as number ‘3’ and 
‘4’ shown in Table 1) in fonts have the corresponding replacement set, which is 
applicable in more scenarios.  
We perturb test sets in the three datasets described in §3.1 with h_set in I2CES, Fig. 
3 shows the great degradation of accuracy and degrades more when p increases. A 
character X not in predefined vocabulary are marked as ‘unknown’ and an all-zero 
vector is taken as the embedding of X, causes the model to misclassify the input. 
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Fig. 5. Accuracy degradation of VB classifier under DCES attack 
3.3 Defense 
Our methods on defense: the vision-based model (VB) described in §2.2, adversarial 
training & vision-based model (AT+VB). For AT, we disturb train set with h_set in 
I2CES and train on the disturbed data after training on clean data. We test robustness 
of the trained model with DCES neighbors as in (Eger et al., 2019) because of its high 
readability by humans. In adversarial training, (Eger et al., 2019) perturbs the input in 
train set with  all the 20 ICES neighbors, there will be two problems: 1) as mentioned 
in §1, there are some characters in ICES and I2CES that are not like original characters. 
Training a model with dissimilar characters will cause the model to be confused and 
cannot resist visual attack well; 2) the neighbors of ICES and DCES partially overlap, 
which causes part of the test set appears in the train set and has an impact on the au-
thenticity. The improvements we propose(shown in Fig. 4): we first get intersection of 
h_set in I2CES and neighbors in DCES, then randomly take half of the intersection as 
neighbors in DCES to test robustness of the model and the left half as neighbors in 
I2CES for training, which aims to better check the model’s ability to capture visual 
features. Fig. 5 draws the effect of defense: VB is more robust to visual text attack than 
origin Char-CNN and AT+VB can get better results. Especially for DBPedia, AT+VB 
gets 35% accuracy than VB, shows that adversarial training with effective adversarial 
examples makes the model more robust. Meanwhile, both VB and AT+VB can achieve 
as good performance on clean test texts as origin Char-CNN, shows that VB can capture 
both visual and semantic information of characters. 
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Fig. 6. shows the accuracy degradation on ICES based Char-CNN and AT+ICES based Char-
CNN under DCES attack 
‘b’ origin h_set 
linear ᖯ  ▮ Б ƃ Ƃ ɒ ƅ D ᗞ ➤ ᖯ ƅ 
linear + ave Ƅ ᖯ հ һ h ხ Ь Ϧ ƕ Ⴑ	 Ƅ ᖯ ხ Ь 
conv Ƅ ɒ ƃ ɓ ᖯ ხ ᵷ ᵇ Ɒ h Ƅ ɓ ᖯ ხ ᵇ 
conv + ave Ƅ ⴆ ᖯ ხ հ һ h ƕ Ϧ ᵇ Ƅ ⴆ ᖯ ხ Ϧ ᵇ 
Table 4. neighbors in I2CES got from different layers 
We also train ICES-based Char-CNN with adversarial examples as VB, Fig. 6 shows 
that ICES can get comparable results with VB on these datasets. Some possible expla-
nations: 1) we get at most 20 neighbors on CES for each character, the neighbors are 
too few to form a distribution. This leads to what the classifier remembers are samples 
rather than distribution of the samples. In VB trained by AG, cosine similarity between 
embeddings by the 2D-CNN module of ‘z’ and ‘ƶ’ is 0.77, and 0.69 with ‘Z’, which 
shows that the module can’t handle transformations very well.   2) (Meng et al., 2019) 
points out that architecture of the 2D-CNN module needs to be specifically designed to 
capture visual features when dealing with small character images. 
Though AT+VB can achieve great improvements against visual text attack,  accuracy 
drops up to 15% in yelp_review. Part of the drop is on account of the visually dissimilar 
neighbors in DCES. As shown in Table 1, ‘Ⱶ’ and ‘ℌ’ are both DCES neighbors of 
letter ‘H’, it’s hard for human to recognize without linguistic knowledge.  
4 Discussion 
For I2CES, how to get more visually similar neighbors is important. We compare out-
put from two different modules of the trained classifier described in §2.1:  the last con-
volutional module and the final linear module(Linear(500, num_class) in Table 2), di-
mension of which are 1152 and 4378 respectively. Examples of character ’b’ from are 
illustrated in Table 4, we list 10 nearest neighbors in ‘origin’ and take h_set from these 
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neighbors. ‘ave’ means taking 20 images of the 320 ones (mentioned in §2.1) of a char-
acter: a chosen font(name: Dejavu Sans), font size 80, rotation angle from -20 to 20 
degrees, the interval is 2. Results from convolutional layers are much better than former 
one. Number of characters in h_set of linear is very small and linear + ave version is 
a bit higher. Conv version are comparable with conv + ave version while the conv 
versions are much better than linear versions respectively. We consider that linear lay-
ers aim at better classifying and get the most possible label which leads to ignoring 
unimportant ones, while main purpose of convolutional layers is taking visual features 
of images. Conv version is finally selected is because conv version costs less compu-
tation resources than conv + ave version while having comparable performance. 
5 Related Work 
Work on adversarial attack and vision-based models are important for our work. 
Adversarial Attack aims to fool neural models by modifying models’ input, while 
humans can still understand the input. In NLP, (Li et al., 2018) follows the general steps 
of attacking NLP systems: they calculate the importance of characters with jacobian 
matrix or a score function and modify the most important ones. These operations need 
to get information the neural models, while our method is black-box (no use of models) 
and preserves high readability of attacked texts for humans. Adversarial training 
(Goodfellow et al., 2015) is a common method: disturbing training data in the way of 
disturbing test data. Adversarial training is not usually very useful, such as against more 
complex attack (Carlini and Wagner, 2017). 
Vision-based models were proposed by (Shimada et al., 2016) and (Dai and Cai,  2017) 
to cope with languages like Chinese and Japanese. They generate character embeddings 
with a convolutional autoencoder and show improvement on author and publisher 
identification tasks. (Liu et al., 2017) creates embeddings from a CNN and shows that 
models with these embeddings are more useful for rare characters. (Eger et al., 2019) 
gets embeddings of characters by flattening the character images and improves the 
robustness of model against visual text attack. 
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this work, we regard visual text attack as a kind of important adversarial attack in 
NLP because it’s normal in the real world. To get more human-readable adversarial 
examples, we incorporate 2-D visual features of characters, which we call I2CES. We 
show that I2CES perturbations on text cause traditional neural classifiers to misunder-
stand meaning of the text on three classification datasets. We apply a vision-based 
model and results show that the vision-based model is more robust to visual attack 
without losing the accuracy on clean examples.  
Our work can be easily applied to real systems which is helpful for the systems facing 
visual attack such as spam, junk messages.  
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Results also show that more future work needs to be done: 1) linguistic knowledge 
should be integrated into models to defense attack from different domains. 2) languages 
such as Chinese, Korean are much more sophisticated than English in glyph structure 
and visual attack in these languages is also frequent in real life, so attack on these lan-
guages should be paid attention. 
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